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Abstract 
We study the effect of rollover risk on the risk of default using a comprehensive 
database of U.S. industrial firms during 1986–2013. Dependence on bank financing is 
the key driver of the impact of rollover risk on default risk. Default risk and rollover 
risk present a significant positive relation in firms dependent on bank financing. In 
contrast, rollover risk is uncorrelated with default probability in the case of firms that 
do not rely on bank financing. Our measure of rollover risk is the amount of long-term 
debt maturing in one year, weighted by total assets. In the case of a firm that depends 
on bank financing, an increase of one standard deviation in this measure leads to a 
significant increase of 3.2% in its default probability within one year. Other drivers 
affecting the interaction between rollover risk and default risk are whether a firm 
suffers from declining profitability and has poor credit. Additionally, rollover risk’s 
impact on default probability is stronger during periods when credit market conditions 
are tighter. 
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1. Introduction 
Rollover (refinancing) risk arises when a firm’s debt is close to maturity but the 
firm wants to refinance it. During the financial crisis of 2007–2009, rollover risk 
exacerbated default risk because liquidity deteriorated in debt markets. This lack of 
liquidity negatively affected the main channel used by firms needing to refinance their 
maturing debt. He and Xiong (2012) theorize that this interaction between rollover 
risk and default risk, where rollover risk sharpens conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debt holders because shareholders have to bear refinancing costs, 
making equity holders declare the firm insolvent earlier, thus increasing the default 
probability. 
Empirical evidence about the effect of rollover risk over default risk is in its early 
stages.1 This paper empirically examines rollover risk using a comprehensive dataset 
of industrial firms in the U.S. market from 1986 to 2013. We thus provide new 
evidence on this issue by exploring whether a firm’s financing structure drives this 
risk. Our key finding is that rollover risk increases the default probability of firms that 
depend on bank financing. This increase is greater if they suffer from declining 
profitability and poor credit quality. Moreover, crises in credit market boost the 
effect.2 In contrast, we do not find significant evidence of this rollover risk effect 
                                                     
1 To the best of our knowledge, only two published articles (Gopalan, Song, and Yerramilli, 2014; 
Valenzuela, 2015) document that firms that experience large increases in rollover risk are likely to 
suffer a strong deterioration in their credit quality. The work of Chen, Xu, and Yang (2012) and Hu 
(2010) also relates to this topic. 
2 The literature argues that firms that depend on bank financing are different from firms that enjoy  
wider financing choices, because bank-dependent firms tend to face more difficulties with long-term 
borrowing, have lower debt capacity, and suffer greater liquidity risk (e.g., Mian and Santos, 2011). In 
turn, we hypothesize that the impact of rollover risk on increasing default risk is stronger for 
bank-dependent firms than for non-bank-dependent firms. This is the central hypothesis in this paper 
and it is illustrated thoroughly in Section 2.2. 
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(RRE) for firms that do not rely on bank financing. The risk is not significant, even 
when such firms have weak fundamentals or credit markets are in crisis. 
Our sample contains all publicly traded industrial firms in the U.S. market from 
1986 to 2013. We employ a panel data regression. We measure default risk using the 
expected default frequency based on the Merton’s (1974) model. Our measure of 
rollover risk is the amount of the firm’s long-term debt outstanding at the end of year 
t – 1, due for repayment in year t, weighted by total assets. This measure is attractive 
because it is usually uncorrelated with the firm’s current risk characteristics. 
Therefore, we avoid possible endogeneity problems that could arise with other 
commonly used proxies for rollover risk (e.g., proportion of short-term debt in total 
debt; see Harford et al., 2014). 
Our evidence suggests that rollover risk is significant for bank-dependent (BD) 
firms, because such firms suffer from significant increases in default rates when 
rollover risk increases, even after we control for a comprehensive list of default risk 
factors, firm fixed effects, and year fixed effects. However, rollover risk is not 
significant in the case of firms that do not depend on bank financing, suggesting that 
the source of financing (banks or other sources) is the factor determining the impact 
of rollover risk. 
Rollover risk is not only statistically significant but also economically substantial. 
For a BD firm, a one standard deviation increase in the rollover risk measure leads to 
a significant 3.2% increase in the default probability during the next year. 
To gain more insight about the effect of rollover risk on the default probability, we 
examine several factors that could influence this effect. We find that, for BD firms, 
RRE is particularly stronger among those with declining profitability and poor credit 
quality. Moreover, tighter credit markets amplify the effect. In contrast, the RRE for 
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non-BD firms is not significant, even under these amplification forces, suggesting that 
a firm’s dependence on bank financing plays a dominant role in driving the impact of 
rollover risk on default. 
For BD firms, a one standard deviation increase in the rollover risk measure 
increases the default probability by 7.6% when firms also experience declining 
profitability, but decreases it by 2.7% when firms become profitable. The default 
probability increases from 3.5% to 5.2% when firms suffer from poor credit. In 
contrast, the default probability decreases from 2.8% to 11.1% when firms enjoy good 
credit. During periods of stress in credit markets, the default probability increases 
from 6.4% to 14.4%. However, under normal market circumstances, the default 
probability increases by only 1%. 
We present several robustness tests. First, in the baseline analysis, we classify a 
firm as BD when it has no ratings (Chava and Purnanandam, 2011). We realize that 
this bank dependence identification strategy is open to criticism. For example, a firm 
could not be rated because it chose to not ask for a rating, irrespective of whether it 
relies on financing from banks or from other sources. Therefore, we adopt an 
alternative identification scheme by examining a firm’s actual dependence on bank 
loans relative to its total assets. Second, we use the ratio of debt maturing in more 
than three years to total debt as an alternative measure of rollover risk. Third, we use 
stock returns volatility as an alternative default risk measure and repeat the baseline 
regressions. Overall, the results from these robustness tests largely support our 
baseline findings. 
This study adds to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature on both debt maturity and credit risk by empirically validating the 
theoretical prediction that rollover risk arising from a firm’s debt maturity structure 
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increases the firm’s overall credit risk (e.g., Morris and Shin, 2009; He and Xiong, 
2012). 
Second, we complement empirical studies on the RRE by showing that the level 
of dependence on bank financing largely drives the rollover risk channel, in which BD 
firms experience a significant increase in default probability because of their exposure 
to rollover risk. Moreover, our findings suggest that, if BD firms can properly manage 
their debt maturity structure, this strategy could help mitigate the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, we find that rated firms do not suffer additional default risk arising 
from rolling over debt. This result is inconsistent with the findings of Gopalan et al. 
(2014). One possible explanation for this disagreement could be that we assess default 
risk based on Merton’s (1974) model, which provides a continuous, absolute measure 
of default risk that changes over the course of the credit cycle, reflecting changes in 
the level of default risk. However, Gopalan et al. use credit ratings as a proxy for 
default risk, which can only reflect relative rankings of credit risk across firms at each 
time (see the discussion by Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman, 2012). 
Finally yet importantly, this article also contributes to the bank dependence 
literature by highlighting adverse consequences of relying on bank financing (e.g., 
Chava and Purnanandam, 2011). Our evidence suggests that bank dependence exposes 
firms to higher default risk because of the additional impact of rollover risk. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: We present related literature and 
our hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 describes the main variables and the data. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 documents robustness tests. 
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the results and suggestions for further 
research. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
This section outlines both theoretical and empirical research into the effect of 
rollover risk on default risk and discusses the potential impact of reliance on bank 
financing. 
 
2.1  RRE on Default Risk 
2.1.1 Theoretical Background 
Recent studies propose theoretical models in which rollover (refinancing) risk 
increases default risk. Morris and Shin (2009) incorporate insights from the bank-run 
literature (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) into a stylized model and examine the 
interaction, showing that a negative fundamental shock can increase the probability of 
short-term debt holders deciding not to refinance, which then increases the bank’s 
default probability. He and Xiong (2012) apply Myers’s (1977) notions to Leland and 
Toft’s (1996) model and find that, when debt market liquidity deteriorates, firms face 
rollover losses if they issue new bonds to replace maturing bonds. To avoid default, 
equity holders must bear rollover losses. The intrinsic conflict of interest between debt 
and equity holders could force equity holders to choose a higher fundamental firm 
value as a default barrier. In the presence of refinancing risk, a firm has a lower 
probability of survival. Forte and Peña (2011) also investigate the long-run effects of 
refinancing and find that debt refinancing increases default risk and induces 
systematic rating downgrades, unless some minimum level of firm value growth 
occurs. Deviations from this growth path imply asymmetric results: Lower firm value 
growth generates downgrades and higher firm value growth generates upgrades. 
However, downgrades tend to be greater in absolute terms. 
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A key implication of these theoretical contributions is that the amount of firm 
debt that matures in the short term increases the firm’s overall default probability, 
beyond traditional default risk factors, causing the RRE we define herein. 
 
2.1.2 Empirical Evidence 
Recent empirical evidence indicates the existence of an RRE. Gopalan et al. 
(2014) find that firms with greater exposure to rollover risk have poorer credit ratings. 
The RRE is also stronger among firms with speculative-grade ratings and declining 
profitability, as well as during economic recessions. According to Chen et al. (2012), 
a bigger drop in the maturity of debt led to larger increases in credit spreads during 
the 2007–2009 crisis. This maturity effect on credit spreads is more pronounced for 
firms with high leverage or high systematic risk. Valenzuela (2015) finds that debt 
market illiquidity increases firms’ corporate bond spreads through rollover risk in the 
international context. Our first hypothesis follows directly from these theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence. 
 
H1: Firms with high exposure to rollover risk suffer higher default risk than firms 
without such exposure. 
 
Empirical studies that use particular proxies for default risk usually study a 
restricted sample that does not cover all firms. For example, they use credit ratings, 
corporate bond spreads, or credit default swap spreads, limiting samples to large or 
less risky firms. We argue though that it is important to study all firms, especially 
those that have not been widely considered thus far. In particular, unrated firms, which 
represent a rather large proportion of U.S. firms, are ignored in previous studies. Due 
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to these considerations, we employ a general default risk measure and study a 
comprehensive sample, which should lead to more robust conclusions. 
 
2.2  Bank Financing Dependence on the RRE 
The RRE is notable with regard to the potential role of alternative financing 
sources. To address this insufficiently explored issue, we particularly investigate 
whether reliance on bank borrowing drives the RRE. 
Carey et al. (1993) show that BD firms are more likely to have trouble finding 
long-term debt financing, because bank debts have shorter average maturities than 
publicly traded debt. Lemmon and Zender (2010) also note that unrated firms 
(typically classified as BD firms) tend to exhibit lower debt capacity, possess a lower 
collateral value of assets, and suffer from higher borrowing costs due to financial 
distress. These factors suggest unrated firms are potentially more exposed to rollover 
risk. Finally, Barclay and Smith (1995) find that a firm’s debt maturity correlates 
negatively with credit risk for unrated firms, but positively for rated firms. Their 
findings suggest that higher short-term debt (i.e., higher rollover risk) could thus lead 
to higher credit risk for BD firms, compared with firms that do not rely on bank 
borrowing. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows. 
 
H2: The RRE is stronger for BD firms than for firms that do not depend on bank 
borrowing. 
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3. Variables and Data 
3.1  Variables 
This section explains the measure we used to proxy for default risk, the 
construction of rollover risk as our main explanatory variable, and the characteristics 
of the control variables we employ in the corresponding regression. 
 
3.1.1 Default Risk Variable 
To examine the RRE for all levered firms and obtain as large a sample as 
possible, we cannot use some common proxies for default risk. That is, we need 
default risk measures that are flexible enough to quantify default risk for firms across 
the entire market. We compute the expected default frequency (EDF), based on 
Merton’s (1974) model, as the baseline measure of default risk; it has been widely 
used to indicate default risk for non-financial corporations (Bharath and Shumway, 
2008; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Hovakimian et al., 2012). We adopt Moody’s 
well-known KMV approach to measure EDF, defined as 
 
( ) ( )2log 2V
V
V B T
EDF N
T
µ σ
σ
  + −
  = −
    
,                 (1)
 
where N(.) is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distribution, V 
is a firm’s total asset value, B represents a firm’s face value of debt, σV is the volatility 
of the firm’s asset return, μ offers an estimate of the expected long-run return of a 
firm’s asset return, and T indicates the maturity of a firm’s debt. The EDF measure is 
a statistical prediction of default over some specified time horizon; we calculate the 
one-year default probability. In addition, we implement an estimate based on a 
one-year rolling window, updated monthly, to obtain time-series EDF data. We 
explain the details of the estimation procedure in Appendix A. 
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Using EDF provides several advantages. Unlike credit ratings, which measure 
the relative probability of default at a fixed number of discrete levels, EDF is a 
continuous, absolute measure that changes over the course of the credit cycle 
(Hovakimian et al., 2012).3 When the aim is to capture the time-series dimension of 
default risk, EDF is a more appropriate measure of default risk than credit ratings.4 
Furthermore, computing EDF only requires stock price and accounting information, 
both of which are publicly available, so we can measure the default risk for many 
firms, rather than just a restricted group. Finally, EDF measures the likelihood of a 
firm defaulting in the future, rather than the past, which is the spirit of the RRE. 
Alternatively, for a robustness check, we use stock volatility as the default risk 
measure. We present a detailed discussion in Section 5.3. Overall, both default risk 
measures (i.e., EDF and stock volatility) support our two hypotheses. 
 
3.1.2 Rollover Risk Variable 
We use the proportion of long-term debt that matures every year to gauge the 
impact of rollover risk by following several recent papers (e.g., Almeida et al., 2012; 
Gopalan et al., 2014). Long-term debt payable during the year essentially captures 
rollover risk because debt matures near time and also depends on the firm’s previous 
long-term debt maturity decisions but is less correlated with the firm’s current risk 
                                                     
3 Hovakimian et al. (2012) posit that ratings reflect the relative rankings of credit risk at each point in 
time, without reference to an explicit time horizon. Although credit ratings provide an ordinal ranking 
of default risk across firms, depending on the business cycle, mappings between ratings and short-run 
default probabilities may change. 
4 Gopalan et al. (2014) use credit ratings and, as far as we know, we are the first study using EDF to 
examine the RRE.  
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characteristics or credit quality. This measure is thus largely free of the potential 
endogeneity that affects other measures of refinancing risk (e.g., short-term debt). 
The rollover risk variable is defined as (LT)-1,t-1: the amount of a firm’s long-term 
debt outstanding at the end of year t – 1 due for repayment in year t (i.e., Compustat 
item dd1 in year t – 1), weighted by the book value of total assets. A positive value of 
(LT)-1,t-1 implies that a firm’s exposure to rollover risk increases in year t. 
 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
We control for several relevant firm characteristics that could affect a firm’s 
default risk in our empirical model: (1) Cash, the ratio of cash holdings to total assets; 
(2) MTB, the ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets; 
(3) Idiovol, measured using the standard deviation of excess equity returns; 
(4) Tangibility; (5) Size, measured using the logarithm of total assets; (6) R&D, the 
ratio of research and development expenditures to the book value of total assets; 
(7) Tax, the ratio of tax expenditures to the book value of total assets; (8) Profitability, 
the ratio of operating income to sales; (9) Leverage, the ratio of total debt to total 
assets; and (10) IntCov, interest coverage. These variables are commonly adopted in 
the literature on determinants of default risk (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2014). Appendix B 
provides detailed definitions, constructions, and economic rationales for these 
variables. 
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3.2 Data 
We investigate public firms in the U.S. market from 1986 to 2013.5 Financial 
statement data are from Compustat and the stock return data are from the Center for 
Research Security Prices (CRSP). We exclude financial firms (standard industrial 
classification [SIC] codes 6000–6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999), and 
quasi-public firms (SIC codes over 8999), whose capital structure decisions can be 
subject to regulation. In addition, we include only those firms whose total debt 
represents at least 5% of their assets (Chen et al., 2012), to avoid inappropriately 
contrasting firms that can issue long-term debt with ones that cannot. To minimize the 
effects of outliers on the results, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles (e.g., values exceeding the 99th percentile are set equal to the 99th 
percentile). The final sample size featured comprises 67,609 firm–year observations, 
representing 10,479 firms. 
To investigate whether the RRE is stronger for BD firms, we first need to 
identify borrowers that depend on their lenders. We use Standard & Poor’s long-term 
issuer-level rating, extracted from the Compustat database, to identify a firm as either 
a BD firm or a non-BD firm. The prior literature similarly uses rating information to 
discriminate between BD and non-BD firms (e.g., Chava and Purnanandam, 2011), 
because firms that do not have ratings likely lack access to public debt markets and 
depend on bank loan borrowing. 6  Our final sample contains 45,529 firm–year 
                                                     
5 We use 1986 as the initial year because the Compustat database started to cover credit ratings that 
year. Furthermore, our sample includes all firms during this period; thus, there is no survivorship bias. 
6 We also use the ratio of a firm’s bank debt to total assets as an alternative proxy for bank 
dependence. Since the bank debt information is covered only rather comprehensively since 2002, we 
treat this analysis as evidence of robustness and provide the results in the robustness section (i.e., 
Section 5.1). 
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observations for BD firms (approximately 67% of the full sample) and 22,080 
firm–year observations for non-BD firms (approximately 33% of the full sample). 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables, including (LT)-1,t-1, EDF, 
and the firm characteristics used as regressors in our empirical model. In terms of the 
full sample (Panel A), the mean EDF is about 0.117 and its median is 0.001, 
indicating that its distribution is very right skewed and almost half of the firms are 
less likely to default, according to the very low median value. The mean (median) for 
(LT)-1,t-1 is 0.029 (0.012); an interquartile range of 0.032 implies wide variation in this 
debt maturity measure across firms. 
We also present the firm characteristics for BD and non-BD subsamples 
separately in Panel B. Regarding our key variable (LT)-1,t-1, we find average levels of 
0.034 for BD firms and 0.018 for non-BD firms. The median value shows a similar 
pattern, namely, 0.015 for BD firms and 0.008 for non-BD firms, suggesting that BD 
firms experience greater rollover risk. The EDF measure is approximately 13.7% for 
BD firms and 7.7% for non-BD firms, indicating that BD firms are generally more 
likely to default.7 As for the alternative default risk measure of StockVol, BD firms 
experienced greater stock volatility (0.7) than non-BD firms (0.4), consistent with the 
expectation that firms depend on bank financing, have restricted to access other 
funding sources, and are more likely to default. Furthermore, BD firms tend to be 
smaller and less profitable and have lower asset tangibility, tax rates, leverage, and 
interest coverage; in contrast, they have higher cash holdings, market-to-book ratios, 
idiosyncratic volatility, and R&D expenditures. These differences are statistically 
                                                     
7 Hovakimian et al. (2012) find that the average one-year default probability is about 5% for unrated 
firms and 1.6% for rated firms—lower than in our sample. A possible explanation of this difference is 
that our sample covers three years (2009, 2010, 2011) that do not appear in their sample and that are 
particularly turbulent, which likely leads to higher default probabilities. 
 15 
 
significant at the 1% level (except for MTB) and generally consistent with our 
expectations and the literature.8 Because of the difference among these variables 
between BD firms and non-BD firms, it is important to control for them in our 
regression analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
3.3 Correlation Matrix 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables. The correlation between 
(LT)-1,t-1 and EDF is 0.16 in the full sample (Panel A) and 0.016 in the subsample of 
BD firms (Panel B), but only 0.1 in the case of non-BD firms (Panel C). This 
preliminary result is consistent with our prediction that higher rollover risk would lead 
to higher default risk and this influence is stronger for firms that depend on bank 
financing. The signs of the correlations between EDF and the other factors are also as 
generally expected; that is, Cash, MTB, Tangibility, Size, Tax, Profitability, and 
IntCov are negatively related to EDF, whereas Idiovol and Leverage are positively 
related to it. 
 
 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
                                                     
8 Chava and Purnanandam (2011) show that BD firms have lower leverage and profitability but greater 
default risk, market to book, and equity volatility. Hovakimian et al. (2012) find similar results and also 
show that BD firms have lower tangibility, size, and taxes. Santos and Winton (2008) find that BD 
firms have lower leverage and spend more on R&D. 
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4. Empirical Results 
We present the results in four sections, focusing on (1) the results of testing the 
effect of rollover risk on default risk in the baseline case, (2) the test of the hypothesis 
that bank borrowing dependence strengthens the RRE, and (3) the extent to which 
RRE is amplified by micro-level forces and (4) stressed credit markets. 
 
4.1  Baseline Results 
We employ a fixed effect regression to examine whether rollover risk increases 
the default risk at the firm level, that is, 
( ) titi1ti LTEDF ,1,, FEYear FE Firm eγβa +++++= −−− 1ti,X .      (2) 
where the dependent variable, tiEDF , , represents firm i’s expected default frequency 
during year t. The key independent variable, (LT)-1,t-1, denotes the amount of a firm’s 
long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t – 1 due for repayment in year t, scaled 
by the book value of total assets. Thus, a larger value of (LT)-1,t-1 implies that a firm’s 
exposure to rollover risk increased during year t. 
We control for many firm characteristics ( 1ti,X − ) that could affect the firm’s 
default risk, as detailed in Section 3.1.3. Furthermore, we include year fixed effects to 
control for any macroeconomic variables and firm fixed effects to control for 
unobservable factors across firms that also affect default risk. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, clustered at the firm level. 
Table 3 presents the baseline results. Column (1) reports the estimators without 
control variables and shows that the estimated coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 is positive and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level, consistent with H1. The 
coefficient of 0.202 implies that a one standard deviation increase in (LT)-1,t-1 leads to 
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an 11.4% increase in default rates.9 Thus, the effect of rollover risk on default risk is 
not only statistically but also economically significant. 
Next, we control for other default risk factors to examine whether the RRE is still 
present. To reduce concerns of multicollinearity, we run a set of regressions in which 
we carefully choose control variables based on their correlations (see Table 2). In 
particular, Columns (2) to (4) of Table 3 report the results of regressions that include 
controls with correlations between each other below 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5, respectively, 
and Column (5) presents the estimators on the specification with all the control 
variables.10 The estimated coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 retains a statistical significance of at 
least 5% across all regressions. The economic impact is also substantial. The result in 
the case of controlling all the control variables (Column (5)) demonstrates that the 
coefficient of 0.058 implies that a one standard deviation increase in (LT)-1,t-1 leads to 
a 3.3% increase in default rates. 
Regarding the influence of the control variables, the results are largely consistent 
with our expectations: Cash, MTB, Tangibility, Tax, and Profitability are significantly 
negatively related to EDF, whereas Idiovol, R&D, and Leverage are significantly 
positively related to it. The coefficients of IntCov and Size are positive and significant, 
which seems bizarre (see Column (5) of Table 3). However, the Pearson correlations 
                                                     
9 We compute economic impact as follows. We multiply one standard deviation of (LT)-1,t-1 (0.066, as 
shown in Table 1) with the estimated coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 (0.202 in this case) and then divide this 
figure by the unconditional mean value of EDF (0.117, as shown in Table 1). In other words, 0.202 × 
0.066 = 0.0133 and 0.0133/0.117 = 11.395%. 
10 We also perform variance inflation factor tests on all model specifications in Table 3 to check the 
multicollinearity problem. The variance inflation factor statistics are all below two, indicating no 
multicollinearity problem. We thank a reviewer for pointing this out. 
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provided in Table 2 show highly negative correlations between EDF and IntCov 
(‒0.18), as well as between EDF and Size (‒0.17), both consistent with expectations.11 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.2  Does dependence on bank financing matter? 
H2 argues that bank financing dependence amplifies the impact of rollover risk on 
increasing default probabilities. We empirically examine this hypothesis in this 
section. To do so, we run the above baseline regressions on the two subsamples that 
contain BD and non-BD firms, respectively and we report the results in Table 4. 
 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
Focusing on BD firms, we find the coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 is positive and highly 
significant across all model specifications with different sets of control variables (see 
Panel A of Table 4). On the other hand, for non-BD firms, although the coefficient of 
(LT)-1,t-1 is positive, the variable loses its power in determining a firm’s default 
probability once control variables are included (see Panel B). Therefore, our findings 
support our central hypothesis, that bank dependence is an important driving force in 
                                                     
11 Furthermore, the coefficient of IntCov is negative (as expected) in the regression that excludes 
explanatory variables with relatively higher correlations among each other (see Column (4)). For 
further checks, we perform several tests. First, we run regressions in which we remove two independent 
variables that have rather strong correlations with IntCov (tax and profitability) from the regression. 
The results are given in the Online Appendix, Table OA1 (Columns (1)–(3)), and show that while the 
coefficient of IntCov is positive, it is not statistically significant. Second, we consider the contradicting 
result for Size could be due to firm fixed effects, which largely absorb the influence of Size on EDF. 
Therefore we run the regression with random effects instead of fixed effects in the main analysis. We 
give the results in the Online Appendix, Table OA1 (Columns (4)–(6)). Indeed, we find that the sign of 
Size is negatively related to EDF in the regression that includes Size as the only control variable. We 
note that the correlation between Size and Idiovol is very high (‒0.54) and consider the problem of 
multicollinearity could be driving the regression results. We exclude Idiovol from the model and find 
that Size is negatively related to EDF. Importantly, the coefficient of our main variable of interest, 
(LT)-1,t-1, is always positive and significant across all these complementary regressions, further 
supporting the rollover risk hypothesis. 
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increasing a firm’s default risk through the channel in which a firm faces higher 
refinancing costs when rolling over their maturing loans. 
The economic impact is different between BD firms and non-BD firms. For 
example, a one standard deviation increase in (LT)-1,t-1 leads to a 11.2% increase in 
default rates for BD firms, whereas it is only 6.3% for non-BD firms, for the case of 
no control variables (Column (1)). 12  After we control for many firm risk 
characteristics (Column (5) of Table 4), a BD firm, on average, experiences a 
significant 3.2% increase in default rates for a one standard deviation increase in 
(LT)-1,t-1. On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase in (LT)-1,t-1 raises a 
non-BD firm’s default rate by only 0.8%. 
Overall, our results suggest that the RRE on increasing default rates has different 
impacts on firms according to their dependence on bank borrowing. This effect is of 
material importance for BD firms but not non-BD firms. We should address that the 
results above constitute evidence on the lower limit of the effect of rollover risk on 
credit risk. Typically, BD firms use more short-term debt than non-BD firms do.13 If 
we consider short-term debt likely to amplify this effect, it can be even stronger for 
BD firms. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
                                                     
12 We compute the economic impacts based on summary statistics for BD and non-BD firms, 
respectively (see Table 1). 
13 The reason to not use short-term debt measures is the potential for endogeneity. The amount of 
short-term debt outstanding likely relates to the default risk (e.g., Almeida et al., 2012). 
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4.3 Micro-Level Amplification Forces 
To provide more insights on the relation between debt maturity structure and firm 
default risk, we perform a number of tests on exploring several micro-level 
amplification forces. 
 
4.3.1 Decline in Profitability 
Theory suggests that negative shocks faced by firms could amplify RRE. For 
example, Diamond (1991) points out that maturing debt exposes a firm to refinancing 
risk only if the revealed information is negative, which lenders might not 
refinance—thus forcing a firm into premature liquidation. He and Xiong’s (2012) 
model highlights that negative shock leads to a drop in a firm’s liquid reserves and 
causes it to suffer refinancing losses even more when it is rolling over its short-term 
debts. 
We test this prediction by estimating Equation (2) with two additional variables. 
The first one is Decline, a dummy variable that identifies firms experiencing a decline 
in profitability during the year compared to the previous year. The second variable is 
the interaction of (LT)-1,t-1 x Decline. The main variable of interest is the interaction 
variable, for which we expect a significant and positive sign, consistent with the 
theoretical prediction. We separately examine BD and non-BD firms and present the 
results in Table 5. 
Focusing on BD firms, we find the coefficient of the (LT)-1,t-1 x Decline 
interaction variable is highly significant and positive (Column (1) of Panel A of Table 
5), suggesting rollover risk is associated with a more severe increase in default risk for 
firms that experience a decline in profitability, consistent with the theory. 
Interestingly, we find that the coefficient of the standalone variable (LT)-1,t-1 is 
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significantly negative, suggesting that maturing debts themselves are not necessary 
conditions for refinancing risks, but only when firms face negative operating 
performance. 
In terms of economic impacts, we find that a one standard deviation increase in 
(LT)-1,t-1 increases EDF by 7.6% when firms face a year-on-year decline in 
profitability, whereas it decreases EDF by 2.7% when firms have a year-on-year 
increase in profitability.14 
In contrast, in the case of non-BD firms (Column (1) of Panel B of Table 5), the 
coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 is not significant. This finding suggests that a firm’s 
dependence on bank financing plays a dominant role in driving the rollover risk 
hypothesis, whether a firm’s profitability declines or not.15 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
                                                     
14 The total effect of (LT)-1,t-1 is the summation of the estimated coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 and the 
interaction of (LT)-1,t-1 and Decline, which gives us –0.048 + 0.183 = 0.135. Thus, the economic impact 
is computed by multiplying this added coefficient and the standard deviation of (LT)-1,t-1 and then 
dividing it by the mean of EDF, which gives (0.135*0.077)/0.137 = 7.6%. In the case of no decline in 
profitability (i.e., the Decline dummy variable is zero), the economic impact is computed as 
(–0.048*0.077)/0.137 = –2.7%. 
15 We adopt Decline variable following the suggestions in Gopalan et al. (2014). However, this 
Decline variable may not fairly capture a shock. For example, the entire industry does not perform well 
but a firm is still a better performer than the rest of the industry. In order to deal with this issue, we 
posit an alternative declining profitability indicator, the Decline_Industry, which is a dummy variable 
that identifies firms having year-on-year decline in profitability. This declining magnitude is larger than 
the industry-level declining magnitude. We replace Decline_Industry with Decline and rerun the 
regression in Table 5 (Column 1). The results are consistent with our main findings (see the Online 
Appendix, Table OA2) 
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4.3.2 Credit Quality 
Theory also suggests that the RRE tends to be stronger for firms with poor credit, 
because such firms face more difficulties extending the maturity of their debt. For 
example, Diamond (1991) argues that firms of low credit quality that face greater 
liquidity risk demand longer-term debt to reduce this risk but cannot find lenders 
willing to supply it at reasonable cost. Mian and Santos (2011) show that only 
creditworthy firms can choose to refinance at a lower rate, whereas lower credit 
quality firms, instead, have minimal access to new capital at a reasonable cost, such 
that they incur substantial rollover losses. 
To test this prediction, we use Altman’s (1968) Z-score as a proxy for a firm’s 
credit quality. We first create the dummy variable Altman_Z-B50 to indicate that firms 
with Z-score below the median are regarded as having poor credit. We then modify 
our baseline regression Equation (2) by adding this poor credit dummy and its 
interaction term with (LT)-1,t-1. We are interested in the coefficient of the interaction 
variable. A positive coefficient of the interaction variable would suggest that the 
amplification effect of rollover risk on default rates is stronger among firms with 
worse credit. 
In addition to Altman’s Z-score, we consider three alternative credit quality 
proxies: Ohlson’s (1980) score, idiosyncratic equity volatility, and leverage. We 
perform similar tests for each of the credit quality proxies, that is, we construct 
dummy variables equal to one if the measure in nature has poorer credit. Unlike the 
Altman Z-score, these variables are positively related to the level of risk and thus the 
dummy variable assumes a value of one for firms with the variable above the median 
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among firms for a given year (i.e., poorer credit) and zero otherwise. These dummies 
are Ohlson-A50, Idiovol-A50, and Leverage-A50, respectively.16 
We examine the impact of a firm’s credit quality condition on the RRE for BD 
and non-BD firms separately. The results are reported in Columns (2) to (5) of Table 5, 
corresponding to the above-mentioned indicators of poor credit. We find that the 
interaction variable is positive and highly significant for BD firms, suggesting that 
poor credit indeed amplifies the RRE. In contrast, we find the interaction variable is 
not significant for non-BD firms. This finding seems to again indicate that bank 
financing dependence drives the RRE, irrespective of a firm’s credit quality. 
We examine how much a firm’s credit quality would affect the RRE in 
terms of economic impact. In the case of the BD group, our results show that a 
one standard deviation increase in (LT)-1,t-1, increases EDF by between 3.5% 
and 5.2%, depending on the credit quality proxy.17  
In contrast, the results based on the standalone (LT)-1,t-1 variables (capturing the 
RRE for firms with better credit) show that a one standard deviation increase in 
(LT)-1,t-1 decreases EDF by 2.8% to 11.1%, depending on the credit quality proxy.18 
This finding may be explained by some theoretical arguments. The asset substitution 
theory suggests that short-term debt can alleviate the asset substitution problem as 
firms with more short-term debt are subject to frequent renegotiations and scrutiny of 
                                                     
16 In addition to identifying a firm with poor credit based on the median Altman Z-score and Ohlson 
score values, we consider other identification schemes adopted in the literature. In particular, we 
classify a firm as having poor credit when its Altman Z-score is lower than 1.81 (distress zone to 
default) or lower than 2.99 (gray zone to default) and its Ohlson score is greater than 0.5. The results 
continue to support our main findings (see the Online Appendix, Table OA3). 
17 In particular, EDF increases by 3.8% in the case of Altman Z-B50, 3.5% in the case of Ohlson-A50, 
4.3% in the case of Idiovol-A50, and 5.2% in the case of Leverage -A50. 
18 In particular, EDF decreases by 4.5% in the case of Altman Z-B50, 4.3% in the case of Ohlson-A50, 
2.8% in the case of Idiovol-A50, and 11.1% in the case of Leverage -A50. 
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the borrowers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), resulting in lower firm risk. The 
asymmetric information theory argues that a low-risk firm exploits more short-term 
debts (see discussion in Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991)).  
Overall, the results suggest that rollover risk is associated with a more severe 
increase in default rates for firms that experience declining profitability and have poor 
credit and this amplification force only appears for firms that depend on banks to 
obtain funds. 
 
4.4  Credit Market Conditions 
He and Xiong’s (2012) theoretical model demonstrates that debt market frictions 
cause rollover risk to deteriorate default risk. Therefore, the RRE is expected be 
stronger when credit markets conditions are tighter. 
To test this prediction, we consider three proxies for a stressed credit market. The 
first variable is the spread between yields on Baa- and Aaa-rated corporate bonds. 
This indicator is widely used to represent a default risk or credit risk factor (e.g., 
Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan, 2009).19 We define a dummy variable Baa-Aaa 
Spread that equals one if the spread increases representing stressed credit market and 
zero otherwise. The second variable is the three-month TED spread, which is the 
difference between the interest rate on interbank loans and the T-bill rate. We define 
the dummy variable TED Spread as equal to one if the spread increases, indicating a 
stressed credit market, and zero otherwise.20 The third variable we define is the 
dummy variable Recession, which identifies years classified by the National Bureau 
                                                     
19 We obtain data for the yields from the statistical release published by the Federal Reserve Board.  
20 It is well known that spreads contain default premiums (e.g., Valenzuela, 2015). The TED spread is 
the daily percentage spread between the three-Month London Interbank Offered Rate (based on U.S. 
dollars) and the three-month Treasury bill rate, as calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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of Economic Research (NBER) as recessionary: 1990, 1991, 2001, 2002, 2008, and 
2009. Given that credit market conditions are likely to be related to economic 
conditions, the literature also uses recessions to proxy for distressed credit markets 
(e.g., Valenzuela, 2015) 
To examine this theoretical prediction, we add the interaction term (LT)-1,t-1 x 
Baa-Aaa Spread in the baseline regression. Given that the market condition variable 
only fluctuates over time, we cannot simultaneously control for market conditions and 
year dummies. Considering that the focus of this article is associated with the 
interaction between a firm’s maturity debt structure and a stressed credit market, we 
report the results using time dummies, since this approach controls for all factors that 
simultaneously affect all corporate default risk over time. Nevertheless, we also run 
specifications that include the market condition dummies and exclude year fixed 
effects. To save space, we present the results in the Online Appendix.21 Our main 
findings remain qualitatively identical, regardless of the specification. 
We perform this test for BD and non-BD firms separately and present the results 
in Table 6. Focusing on BD firms, we find the coefficient of the interaction is positive 
and highly significant across all stressed credit market measures (see Panel A). Thus, 
our results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that a stressed credit market is 
crucial to amplify the rollover risk channel through which a firm’s default probability 
substantially increases due to its exposure to refinancing risk. However, once again, 
for non-BD firms, the interaction is insignificant across all models. 
                                                     
21  Table OA4 in the Online Appendix re-estimates the baseline specification including market 
condition dummies but excluding yearly dummies. This specification thus relies on market conditions, 
(i.e., Baa-Aaa Spread, TED Spread, and Recession) rather than year dummies. As expected, the results 
indicate that bad market conditions are positively related to corporate default risk.  
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The economic impact is substantial for BD firms. A one standard deviation 
increase in (LT)-1,t-1, on average, increases EDF by 6.4% to 14.4%22 in times of a 
credit crunch, but only by 0.1% to 1% when the credit market is improved. 
Overall, the results suggest that the rollover risk associated with more severe 
default rates is increased in times of stressed credit market for firms that rely on 
borrowing from banks.23 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
We conduct several robustness checks. First, we use an alternative method to 
identify the level of bank dependence. Second, we use an alternative proxy for 
rollover risk. Third, we re-examine our central hypotheses by using equity volatility 
as the alternative default risk measure. 
 
5.1 Alternative Bank Dependence Measure 
We conduct additional tests to strengthen our findings from the baseline analysis 
on bank dependence by using the firm-level debt structure variable information 
provided in the Capital IQ database to distinguish BD from non-BD firms. Because 
                                                     
22 We compute the economic impact as follows. We use the model specification for recession for BD 
firms as an example (Column (3), Panel A, of Table 6). We multiply one standard deviation of (LT)-1,t-1 
(0.077, as shown in Table 1) with the estimated coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 (0.002 + 0.255) = 0.257 in this 
case) and then divide the previously computed number by the unconditional mean value of EDF 
(0.137, as shown in Table 1). That is, 0.257 × 0.077 = 0.0198 and 0.0198/0.137 = 14.4%. 
23 We repeat the above analysis for the entire sample. The results are similar to those for the BD firms 
(see Table OA5 of the Online Appendix). This suggests that distinguishing between BD and non-BD 
firms is particularly important in terms of exploring the rollover risk hypothesis; otherwise, the true 
RRE for non-BD firms is unlikely to be captured. 
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coverage by Capital IQ is comprehensive only from 2002 onward, the Capital 
IQ-based sample spans 2002 to 2013. We further remove observations with missing 
values in the database of Capital IQ. The sample size is thus reduced to 16,340 
firm–year observations, which covers 24% of the firms selected in the main 
analysis.24 
We give a new definition for bank dependence based on the bank’s debt-to-total 
assets ratio. In this analysis, the BD group is the one that contains firms with a bank 
debt-to-total assets ratio in the top 33%, 25%, 20%, or 10% of firms and the non-BD 
is the group that contains the remainder of the identified BD subjects. The bank 
debt-to-total assets ratio is measured by using bank debt, the sum of term loans and 
revolving credit divided by total assets. 
Table OA6 of Online Appendix reports the estimation results of Equation (2) 
after using the Capital IQ-based identification scheme and for the BD and non-BD 
groups, respectively. We find that the coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 is positive and significant 
for BD firms across different criteria for the bank debt-to-total asset ratio across the 
top 33%, 25%, 20%, and 10%, whereas the coefficients are consistently insignificant 
across all non-BD subsamples. Overall, the Capital IQ-based analysis provides further 
evidence supporting that the RRE is more pronounced for firms that rely on bank 
financing. 
 
5.2 Alternative Rollover Risk Variable 
Following, for example, Barclay and Smith (1995) and Chen et al. (2012), we 
construct a measure of debt maturity using the long-term debt share, which is the 
percentage of total debt that matures in more than three years (ldebt3y). By 
                                                     
24 For a detailed construction of the Capital IQ-based sample, see Chiu, Peña , and Wang (2015). 
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construction, ldebt3y is conversely related to the benchmark measure of (LT)-1,t-1. 
Therefore, if the RRE exists, we should find the estimated coefficient is negative, 
instead of positive, which indicates that ldebt3y reduces EDF. 
We replace (LT)-1,t-1 with ldebt3y and re-examine the regression specifications in 
Table 3 (control variables included), with the results reported in Columns (1) to (3) of 
Table OA7 of Online Appendix. The result for the entire sample (Column (1)) shows 
the negative and significant coefficient of ldebt3y, which confirms a RRE for default 
risk. Columns (2) and (3) provide the regression results, with ldebt3y as the main 
independent variable for BD and non-BD firms, respectively. The coefficient of 
ldebt3y is negative and significant at the 1% level only for BD firms (Column (2)), 
but it is barely significant for the non-BD firms (Column (3)). In terms of economic 
impact, we find that a one standard deviation increase in ldebt3y decreases EDF by 
2.88% in the case of all firms and by 2.91% for BD firms, but only by 0.43% for 
non-BD firms. Overall, these results are consistent with our baseline findings using 
(LT)-1,t-1 as the proxy for rollover risk and further support our central hypotheses. 
 
5.3 Alternative Default Risk Measure 
We use stock volatility as an alternative default risk measure. We define total 
stock return volatility as the annualized standard deviation of daily logarithmic returns 
over the year followed by the firm’s last fiscal year-end, denoted StockVol. This proxy 
is used in a number of studies (e.g., Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Bennett et al., 2015). 
Stock volatility is also viewed as a forward-looking default risk measure, like our 
benchmark default risk proxy of EDF. Furthermore, a firm with a higher standard 
deviation of stock returns is more likely to fall below its default threshold. 
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We rerun the benchmark analysis by replacing EDF with stock volatility and 
show the results in Table 7. First, we run the regression without including any firm 
controls but with firm and year fixed effects and, second, the regression with all the 
controls. We find that the coefficient of (LT)-1,t-1 is highly significant and positive in 
the group of BD firms (Columns (1) and (2)), but insignificant in the group of non-BD 
firms (Columns (3) and (4)). This finding offers further evidence to support our 
argument that BD firms experience greater default risk because of their exposure to 
the risk of rolling over debt. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
We also rerun the analysis related to micro-level amplification forces and credit 
market conditions. The results are reported in Table 8. For BD firms (Panel A), we 
find qualitative similar results as those using EDF as the default risk proxy in terms of 
micro-level amplification forces (see Columns (1)–(5)). With respect to credit market 
conditions, we find a positive but insignificant coefficient for those LT-stressed credit 
market interaction variables. The results indicate that a stressed credit market 
reinforces a firm’s stock volatility but the impact is weaker than in the case using 
EDF as the default risk measure. 
For non-BD firms, echoing our main results, the coefficients of the interaction 
variables are negative in two cases (TED Spread and Recession) and systematically 
insignificant in all cases. The results support the idea that bank dependence dominates 
other possible factors that amplify default risk because of a firm’s exposure to rollover 
risk. 
Finally, we observe that the coefficients of the dummies that identify declining 
profitability (Decline), a firm’s poor credit (Altman_Z-B50, Ohlson_S-A50, 
Idiovol-A50, Leverage-A50), and stressed credit market indicators (Baa-Aaa Spread, 
 30 
 
TED Spread, and Recession) have a positive and significant impact in all cases. This 
is consistent with the analysis in which we use EDF as the default risk measure.25 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
Understanding the economic factors explaining a firm’s credit quality is of 
paramount importance. Merton’s (1974) seminal work singled out the firm’s debt 
structure and the value of its assets as two fundamental variables for explaining a 
firm’s credit quality. Following this intuition, we pay particular attention to one aspect 
of the debt structure, namely, refinancing or rollover risk. Theory stresses its key role, 
but empirical evidence is still preliminary. Using the most comprehensive database to 
date, we consider the extent to which rollover risk has a significant impact on default 
probabilities. 
To this end, we examine the impact on default risk that arises from rollover risk in 
the U.S. market from 1986 to 2013. Our results support the notion that rollover risk is 
significant, though not for all firms. Firms that depend on banks for their refinancing 
needs suffer increases in their credit risk caused by rollover risk. This increase is 
                                                     
25 We also use the Altman Z-score and Ohlson score as alternative default risk proxies. We do not use 
the Altman Z-score (or Ohlson score) as the benchmark for default risk because this proxy is a 
historically based measure, that is, it can only reflect the default risk situation of a firm in the past. In 
contrast, EDF (or stock volatility) is a forward-looking measure, which essentially captures the rollover 
risk that exacerbates the default risk the next year. Therefore, we expect to see a negative (positive) 
relation between the Altman Z-score (Ohlson score) and (LT) - 1 in a contemporaneous setting, rather 
than a lead–lag relation, as examined in the main context. The result is reported in Table OA8 of the 
Online Appendix. The coefficient of (LT) - 1 is negatively (positively) associated with the Altman 
Z-score (Ohlson score) and highly significant in the case of the entire sample and in the subsample of 
BD firms, but not in the subsample of non-BD firms. Therefore, the analysis using the Altman Z-score 
or the Ohlson score as the default risk measure is consistent with the rollover risk hypothesis.  
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stronger for firms that have declining profitability or poor credit. Moreover, stress in 
credit markets magnifies the effect of rollover risk on the default probability. However, 
the default risk of firms that do not depend on bank financing is uncorrelated with 
rollover risk. Therefore, it is important to account for financing sources when 
assessing the interaction between rollover risk and default risk, because a firm’s 
borrowing channel largely determines how rollover risk affects default risk. 
Evidence suggests credit markets are aware of the possible impact of refinancing 
risk on credit quality (Gopalan et al., 2014). Therefore, an immediate extension of our 
work would be to investigate the degree to which banks recognize the importance of 
the RRE, such that they adjust the terms and conditions of loans dedicated to 
refinancing existing debt. This is left for future research. 
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Appendix A: Estimating EDF 
Moody’s KMV model is closely related to the Black–Scholes (1973) model. The 
basic idea is that equity can be viewed as a call option whose underlying asset is a 
firm’s asset value and whose strike price is equal to the face value of the firm’s debt. 
A firm’s market value of assets is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion of 
the form 
,VdV Vdt VdZµ σ= +                      (A1) 
where V is the total value of a firm, μ indicates the expected continuously 
compounded return of V, σV represents the volatility of a firm’s value, and dZ is 
standard Brownian motion. With these assumptions and a Black–Scholes (1973) 
model, we can express a firm’s market value of equity VE as a function of its total 
value, 
( ) ( )1 2rTEV VN d Be N d−= − ,                   (A2) 
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B is the face value of a firm’s debt, r is the risk-free rate, T is the forecast horizon, and 
N(.) is the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
In our exercise, we compute VE as the product of a firm’s outstanding shares and 
its current stock price, assume T equals one year, and treat B as debt in current 
liabilities plus half of the long-term debt, consistent with prior applications. The two 
remaining variables in the Black–Scholes equation—the total asset value of firm V 
and the volatility of firm value σV—are estimated with an iterative procedure 
following the method proposed by Vassalou and Xing (2004). Initially, we estimate σV 
as the annualized standard deviation of a firm’s asset returns, using daily data about 
the summation of the market value of equity and the face value of debt over the past 
year. This method provides an initial estimate of σV and, together with the market 
value of equity and other inputs, Equation (A2) indicates the daily values of V. Using 
these estimated values of V, we generate new estimates of σV with the implied log 
returns on assets. The new estimate of σV enters the next iteration until the difference 
in values of σV across two consecutive iterations is less than 10-3. Then we take the 
final estimated σV and its implied V. We compute the drift μ by calculating the mean 
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value of the log-returns of V. With these estimated values, EDF can be calculated 
according to Equation (1). 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
This appendix provides details of the construction of the explanatory variables and their economic backgrounds. The terms in parentheses refer 
to item names in their corresponding data sources, as shown in the last column. 
Variable Name Variable Definition Expected Impact on Default Risk Economic Explanation Source 
Default Risk Measures 
EDF Expected default frequency measure based on 
Merton’s (1974) model. The detailed construction is 
described in Section 3.1.1. 
   Compustat/CRSP 
StockVol Annualized standard deviation of daily log stock 
returns (RET) over the next year of the accounting 
fiscal year-end (requires at least 20 daily observations 
over this period). 
   CRSP 
Rollover Risk Variables 
LT-1,t-1 Amount of a firm’s long-term debt outstanding at the 
end of year t – 1 due for repayment in year t (i.e., dd1 
in year t – 1), scaled by the book value of total assets 
(AT). 
+ Hypothesis 1 illustrates the mechanism through 
which rollover risk increases default risk. By 
construction, the larger the LT-1,t-1, the greater the 
rollover risk. 
Compustat 
ldebt3y Ratio of debt that matures in more than 3 years (DLTT 
‒ DD2 ‒ DD3) to total debt (DLC + DLTT) ‒ Hypothesis 1 illustrates the mechanism through which rollover risk increases default risk. By 
construction, the larger the ldebt3y, the lower the 
rollover risk. 
Compustat 
Firm Variables 
Cash Ratio of the book value of cash and marketable 
securities (CHE) to the book value of total assets (AT). 
‒ It serves as a tool to pay debt obligations. Compustat 
MTB 
Ratio of the market value of total assets 
(PRCC_F×CSHO + DLC + DLTT + PSTK ‒ TXDITC) 
to the book value of total assets (AT). 
‒ It reflects growth opportunities and should be 
negatively correlated with default probability, in 
that it represents additional value (over and above 
the book value) that debt holders can access in the 
event of a default. 
Compustat 
Idiovol Idiosyncratic risk: standard deviation of daily excess 
returns relative to the CRSP value-weighted index for 
+ A firm’s asset value is below the default 
boundary; the higher the volatility, the greater the 
CRSP 
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each firm's equity in a year. uncertainty and therefore the higher the default 
probability. 
Tangibility Ratio of the book value of property, plant, and 
equipment (PPENT) to the book value of total assets 
(AT). 
‒ Tangible assets lose less of a firm’s value in 
default than intangible assets do. 
Compustat 
Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
(AT). 
‒ Larger firms are more diversified, which reduces 
operating risks. 
Compustat 
R&D Ratio of research and development expenditures 
(XRD) to the book value of total assets (AT). We 
replace missing values of XRD with zeros. 
+ It reflects the firm’s brand equity and intellectual 
capital and is intangible. Intangible assets tend to 
lose more value than tangible assets in the event 
of default. 
Compustat 
Tax Ratio of tax expenditure (TXT) to the book value of 
total assets (AT). 
‒ Firms with higher tax rates tend to choose more 
conservative capital structures. 
Compustat 
Profitability Ratio of operating income after depreciation (OIADP) 
to total sales (SALE). 
‒ Profitable firms are less likely to default. Compustat 
Leverage Ratio of total debt (DLC + DLTT) to total assets (AT). + Higher leverage implies a greater chance that the 
firm will file for bankruptcy. 
Compustat 
IntCov Interest coverage: the ratio of operating income after 
depreciation (OIADP + XINT) to total interest 
expenditures (XINT). 
‒ The ratio is used to assess how easily a firm pays 
interests on its outstanding debts. Thus, the higher 
the ratio, the less burdened by debt expenses and 
the less likely to default. 
Compustat 
Other Variables 
Decline Dummy variable that identifies firms having a decline 
in Profitability during the year as compared to the 
previous year. 
+ A firm with declining profitability is more likely 
to default. 
Compustat 
Altman_Z-B50 Dummy variable equal to one for firms with an 
Altman Z-score below the sample median for a given 
year. The Altman (1968) Z-score is calculated as Z = 
3.3×(earnings before interest and taxes/total assets) + 
1.0×(sales/total assets) + 1.4×(retained earnings/total 
assets) + 1.2×(working capital/total assets) + 0.6× 
(market value equity/total debt). 
 
+ A firm with a lower Altman Z-score is more likely 
to default. 
Compustat 
Ohlson-A50 Dummy variable equal to one for firms with an 
Ohlson score above the sample median for a given 
+ A firm with a higher Ohlson score is more likely 
to default. 
Compustat 
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year. Ohlson’s (1980) score is calculated as –1.32 – 
0.407(log(total assets)) + 6.03(total liabilities/total 
assets) – 1.43(working capital/total assets) + 
0.076(current liabilities/current assets) – 1.72(1 if total 
liabilities > total assets, 0 otherwise) – 0.521(net 
income – lagged net income)/(|net income| + |lagged 
net income|)). 
Idiovol-A50 Dummy variable equal to one for firms with Idiovol 
above the sample median for a given year. 
+ A firm with greater idiosyncratic volatility is more 
likely to default. 
CRSP 
Leverage-A50 Dummy variable equal to one for firms with Leverage 
above the sample median for a given year. 
+ A firm with more debt is more likely to default. Compustat 
Baa-Aaa Spread Dummy variable that equals 1 if the spread between 
yields on Baa- and Aaa-rated corporate bonds 
increases. 
+ A stressed credit market increases firms’ 
likelihood of default. 
Fed Reserve Bank 
TED Spread Dummy variable that equals 1 if the spread between 
the interest rate on interbank loans and the T-bill rate 
increases. 
+ A stressed credit market increases firms’ 
likelihood of default. 
Fed Reserve Bank 
Recession Dummy variable that identifies years classified by the 
NBER as recessionary, i.e., 1990, 1991, 2001, 2002, 
2008, and 2009. 
+ A stressed credit market increases firms’ 
likelihood of default. 
Fed Reserve Bank 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Panel A shows the summary statistics of the sample of 67,609 firm–year observations from 1986 to 
2013, where EDF is the expected default probability, measured according to Merton’s model; StockVol 
is annualized volatility over the next year; and (LT)-1,t-1 is the amount of a firm’s long-term debt 
outstanding at the end of year t – 1 that is due for repayment in year t, scaled by the current book value 
of total assets. The control variables are Cash, MTB, Idiovol (idiosyncratic risk), Tangibility, Size, R&D, 
Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and IntCov (interest coverage). For details, see Appendix B. Firms are 
identified as either BD, with 45,529 firm–year observations, or non-BD, with 22,080 firm–year 
observations. The identification of bank dependence is based on ratings, in which unrated firms are BD 
firms. The descriptive statistics for the subsamples of BD and non-BD firms are reported in Panel B. 
The statistically significant differences between the characteristics of BD and non-BD firms are at the 
1% level, as indicated by ***. 
Panel A: All firms 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile Interquartile 
EDF 0.117 0.232 0 0.001 0.100 0.100 
StockVol 0.617  0.418  0.336  0.492  0.753  0.417  
LT-1,t-1 0.029 0.066 0.002 0.012 0.032 0.030 
Cash 0.103 0.134 0.017 0.051 0.133 0.116 
MTB 1.416 1.360 0.681 0.995 1.601 0.921 
Idiovol 0.038 0.026 0.020 0.030 0.047 0.026 
Tangibility 0.342 0.237 0.151 0.289 0.499 0.347 
Size 5.608 2.283 3.909 5.562 7.209 3.300 
R&D 0.027 0.061 0 0 0.025 0.025 
Tax 0.019 0.030 0 0.014 0.035 0.035 
Profitability -0.084 0.868 0.013 0.063 0.118 0.105 
Leverage 0.317 0.190 0.174 0.284 0.418 0.244 
IntCov 4.746 15.342 1.515 3.750 7.756 6.241 
Idebt3y 0.537 0.333 0.247 0.590 0.828 0.581 
Panel B: BD firms versus non-BD firms 
 
BD Firms Non-BD Firms Difference of Means 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.   
EDF 0.137 0.247 0.077 0.193 
 
0.060*** 
StockVol 0.701  0.447  0.444  0.280   0.258*** 
LT-1,t-1 0.034 0.077 0.018 0.033  0.016*** 
Cash 0.114 0.146 0.081 0.100 
 
0.033*** 
MTB 1.474 1.484 1.296 1.048 
 
0.178 
Idiovol 0.044 0.028 0.025 0.014 
 
0.019*** 
Tangibility 0.327 0.237 0.374 0.236 
 
-0.048*** 
Size 4.593 1.840 7.702 1.572 
 
-3.109*** 
R&D 0.033 0.071 0.015 0.032 
 
0.018*** 
Tax 0.017 0.031 0.022 0.028 
 
-0.005*** 
Profitability -0.162 1.021 0.079 0.343 
 
-0.241*** 
Leverage 0.299 0.188 0.353 0.187 
 
-0.054*** 
IntCov 3.776 17.445 6.748 9.343 
 
-2.972*** 
Idebt3y 0.454 0.338 0.706 0.249   -0.252*** 
  
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
The table presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical model based on the 
sample of 67,609 firm–year observations from 1986 to 2013, where EDF is the expected default 
probability; StockVol is the annualized volatility over the next year; and (LT)-1,t-1 is the amount of a 
firm’s long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t – 1 that is due for repayment in year t, scaled by 
the current book value of total assets. The control variables are Cash, MTB, Idiovol (idiosyncratic risk), 
Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and IntCov (interest coverage). For details, see 
Appendix B. Panels A to C report the Pearson correlations for the entire sample, for the subsample of 
BD firms, and for the subsample of non-BD firms, respectively.  
Panel A: All firms 
  EDF StockVol (LT)-1,t-1 Cash MTB Idiovol Tangibility Size R&D Tax Profitability Leverage IntCov 
StockVol 0.68 
            (LT)-1,t-1 0.16 0.16 
           Cash -0.03 0.08 -0.02 
          MTB -0.19 -0.01 0.04 0.28 
         Idiovol 0.55 0.80 0.20 0.07 0.00 
        Tangibility -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.27 -0.10 -0.06 
       Size -0.17 -0.47 -0.14 -0.12 -0.19 -0.54 0.12 
      R&D -0.01 0.15 0.02 0.43 0.33 0.16 -0.24 -0.18 
     Tax -0.23 -0.29 -0.10 -0.01 0.15 -0.31 -0.04 0.16 -0.10 
    Profitability -0.11 -0.24 -0.08 -0.32 -0.23 -0.25 0.05 0.23 -0.40 0.18 
   Leverage 0.25 0.14 0.24 -0.15 -0.01 0.14 0.15 0.03 -0.10 -0.24 -0.03 
  IntCov -0.18 -0.30 -0.08 -0.13 -0.01 -0.32 0.00 0.25 -0.29 0.46 0.43 -0.17 
 ldebt3y -0.12 -0.21 -0.24 0.00 -0.04 -0.26 0.17 0.35 -0.10 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.06 
Panel B: BD firms 
  EDF StockVol (LT)-1,t-1 Cash MTB Idiovol Tangibility Size R&D Tax Profitability Leverage IntCov 
StockVol 0.69 
            (LT)-1,t-1 0.16 0.14 
           Cash -0.07 0.04 -0.04 
          MTB -0.20 -0.02 0.04 0.28 
         Idiovol 0.56 0.79 0.18 0.02 -0.01 
        Tangibility -0.00 -0.06 0.04 -0.27 -0.10 -0.05 
       Size -0.15 -0.41 -0.10 -0.06 -0.21 -0.48 0.10 
      R&D -0.03 0.13 0.01 0.44 0.34 0.14 -0.25 -0.17 
     Tax -0.24 -0.29 -0.10 -0.01 0.11 -0.31 -0.03 0.16 -0.12 
    Profitability -0.10 -0.21 -0.08 -0.33 -0.25 -0.22 0.04 0.22 -0.41 0.18 
   Leverage 0.28 0.16 0.28 -0.16 0.00 0.17 0.16 0.00 -0.07 -0.23 -0.05 
  IntCov -0.18 -0.30 -0.08 -0.16 -0.06 -0.32 0.02 0.28 -0.33 0.46 0.44 -0.14 
 ldebt3y -0.11 -0.17 -0.21 0.04 -0.03 -0.20 0.16 0.27 -0.05 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.07 
Panel C: Non-BD firms 
  EDF StockVol (LT)-1,t-1 Cash MTB Idiovol Tangibility Size R&D Tax Profitability Leverage IntCov 
StockVol 0.64 
            (LT)-1,t-1 0.10 0.06 
           Cash 0.04 0.10 0.00 
          MTB -0.20 -0.06 -0.03 0.23 
         Idiovol 0.50 0.73 0.10 0.10 -0.08 
        Tangibility -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.26 -0.07 0.00 
       Size -0.06 -0.28 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 -0.36 0.00 
      R&D -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.35 0.25 -0.01 -0.25 0.06 
     Tax -0.18 -0.24 -0.06 0.03 0.30 -0.29 -0.06 0.09 0.04 
    Profitability -0.11 -0.18 0.01 -0.18 -0.01 -0.20 0.04 0.11 -0.10 0.21 
   Leverage 0.25 0.29 0.20 -0.08 -0.01 0.35 0.10 -0.25 -0.17 -0.31 -0.09 
  IntCov -0.14 -0.19 -0.07 0.12 0.29 -0.24 -0.11 0.19 0.13 0.50 0.24 -0.39 
 ldebt3y -0.01 0.10 -0.30 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.10 -0.14 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.18 -0.14 
  
Table 3. RRE on default risk 
This table presents the results of regressions aimed at understanding the impact of rollover risk on the 
default probability. The dependent variable is EDF, the expected default frequency. The main 
independent variable is (LT)-1,t-1, the long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t – 1 that is due for 
repayment in year t. The control variables are: Cash, MTB, Idiovol (idiosyncratic risk), Tangibility, Size, 
R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and IntCov (interest coverage). For details, see Appendix B. Column 
(1) reports the estimators without control variables. Columns (2) to (4) report the estimators with 
controls with correlations between each other below 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5, respectively. Column (5) reports 
the estimators with all the control variables. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects (FE). 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and are clustered at 
the firm level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
  Choice of control variables 
 
No Correlations < |0.3| Correlations < |0.4| Correlations < |0.5| All 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(LT)-1,t-1 0.202  *** 0.114  *** 0.131  *** 0.126  *** 0.058  ** 
 (0.029)   (0.027)   (0.025)   (0.025)   (0.023)   
Cash t-1       ‒0.056  *** ‒0.015  
       (0.012)   (0.010)   
MTBt-1     ‒0.031  *** ‒0.030  *** ‒0.018 *** 
     (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Idiovol t-1         3.974  *** 
         (0.072)   
Tangibility t-1  0.000   ‒0.001   ‒0.020   ‒0.028 ** 
   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.014)   (0.012)   
Size t-1         0.037  *** 
         (0.002)   
R&D t-1       0.103  *** 0.088  *** 
       (0.039)   (0.034)   
Tax t-1       ‒0.248  *** ‒0.063 * 
       (0.037)   (0.033)   
Profitability t-1      ‒0.010  *** ‒0.005 *** 
       (0.002)   (0.002)   
Leverage t-1   0.210  *** 0.209  *** 0.192  *** 0.117  *** 
   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.008)   
IntCov t-1       ‒0.000   0.000  ** 
       (0.000)   (0.000)   
Constant 0.035  *** ‒0.023  *** 0.026  *** 0.048  *** ‒0.237 *** 
 (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.012)   
Obs. 67,609   67,609   67,609   67,609   67,609   
R2 0.048   0.095   0.133   0.155   0.297   
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
  
Table 4. Bank financing dependence on the RRE 
This table presents the results of regressions on the impact of bank dependence on the rollover risk 
channel to increase the default probability. The dependent variable is EDF, the expected default 
frequency. The main independent variable is (LT)-1,t-1, the long-term debt outstanding at the end of year 
t – 1 that is due for repayment in year t. The control variables are Cash, MTB, Idiovol (idiosyncratic 
risk), Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and IntCov (interest coverage). For details, 
see Appendix B. Column (1) reports the estimators without control variables. Columns (2) to (4) report 
the estimators with controls with correlations between each other below 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5, respectively. 
Column (5) reports the estimators with all the control variables. Panels A and B present the results for 
BD and non-BD firms, respectively. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects (FE). 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and are clustered at 
the firm level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: BD firms 
  Choice of Control Variables 
 
No Correlations < |0.3| Correlations < |0.4| Correlations < |0.5| All 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(LT)-1,t-1 0.199  *** 0.102  *** 0.121  *** 0.115  *** 0.057  ** 
 (0.032)   (0.029)   (0.027)   (0.027)   (0.025)   
Cash t-1       ‒0.068  *** ‒0.031 *** 
       (0.013)   (0.012)   
MTBt-1     ‒0.032  *** ‒0.032  *** ‒0.020 *** 
     (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
Idiovol t-1         3.690  *** 
         (0.077)  
Tangibility t-1  ‒0.001   ‒0.008   ‒0.034  ** ‒0.042 *** 
   (0.017)   (0.016)   (0.017)   (0.014)   
Size t-1         0.040  *** 
         (0.003)   
R&D t-1       0.106  ** 0.104  *** 
       (0.042)   (0.037)   
Tax t-1       ‒0.277  *** ‒0.086 ** 
       (0.046)   (0.041)   
Profitability t-1      ‒0.008  *** ‒0.005 ** 
       (0.002)   (0.002)   
Leverage t-1   0.234  *** 0.238  *** 0.216  *** 0.132  *** 
   (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.010)   
IntCov t-1       0.000  ** 0.000   
       (0.000)   (0.000)   
Constant 0.039  *** -0.026  *** 0.030  *** 0.058   ‒0.211 *** 
 (0.006)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.013)   
Obs. 45,529    45,529    45,529    45,529    45,529    
R2 0.046  
 
0.102  
 
0.147  
 
0.171  
 
0.342  
 Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
  
Panel B: Non-BD firms 
  Choice of Control Variables 
 
No Correlations < |0.3| Correlations < |0.4| Correlations < |0.5| All 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(LT)-1,t-1 0.144  ** 0.068   0.072   0.072   0.018   
 (0.061)   (0.061)   (0.060)   (0.060)   (0.055)   
Cash t-1       ‒0.009   0.035  * 
       (0.024)   (0.021)   
MTBt-1     ‒0.025  *** ‒0.025  *** ‒0.013  *** 
     (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
Idiovol t-1         5.095  *** 
         (0.226)   
Tangibility t-1  ‒0.020   ‒0.009   ‒0.009   ‒0.007   
   (0.022)   (0.022)   (0.024)   (0.021)   
Size t-1         0.041  *** 
         (0.003)   
R&D t-1       ‒0.071   ‒0.011   
       (0.093)   (0.079)   
Tax t-1       ‒0.138  ** 0.030   
       (0.063)   (0.058)   
Profitability t-1      ‒0.011  * 0.004   
       (0.006)   (0.006)   
Leverage t-1   0.139  *** 0.132  *** 0.134  *** 0.067  *** 
   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.019)   (0.016)   
IntCov t-1     ‒0.001 *** 0.001  *** 0.000  * 
     (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Constant 0.031  *** 0.000  *** 0.030  ** 0.034  ** ‒0.334  *** 
 (0.007)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.014)   (0.028   
Obs. 22,080    22,080    22,080    22,080    22,080    
R2 0.060  
 
0.111  
 
0.150  
 
0.155  
 
0.252  
 Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5. Declining profitability and poor credit  
This table presents the results of regressions to test whether the RRE is conditional on a firm’s 
characteristics of declining profitability and credit quality. Panels A and B present the results for 
subsamples that contain BD and non-BD firms, respectively. The dependent variable is EDF, the 
expected default frequency. The main independent variable is (LT)-1,t-1, the long-term debt outstanding 
at the end of year t – 1 that is due for repayment in year t. The control variables are Cash, MTB, Idiovol 
(idiosyncratic risk), Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and IntCov (interest coverage). 
For details, see Appendix B. The variable Decline is a dummy that identifies firms having a decline in 
profitability during the year compared to the previous year. The poor credit indicators are as follows: 
(1) Altman_Z-B50 is a dummy variable that identifies firms with an Altman Z-score (1968) below the 
median value among all firms for a given year; (2) Ohlson-A50 is a dummy variable that identifies 
firms with an Ohlson score above the median value among all firms for a given year; (3) Idiovol-A50 is 
a dummy variable that identifies firms with idiosyncratic risk above the median value among all firms 
for a given year; and (4) Leverage-A50 is a dummy variable that identifies firms with leverage above 
the median value among all firms for a given year. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects 
(FE). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and are 
clustered at the firm level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: BD firms 
    Poor Credit Indicator 
    Altman_Z-B50 Ohlson-A50 Idiovol-A50 Leverage-A50 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(LT)-1,t-1  ‒0.048  *  ‒0.080  ** ‒0.076  ** ‒0.050   
‒0.198  *** 
 
(0.026) 
  
(0.032) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.044) 
 Decline 0.034  ***          
 
(0.002) 
          (LT)-1,t-1 x Decline 0.183  ***          
 
(0.030) 
          Poor Credit     
0.074  *** 0.055  *** 0.095  *** 0.024  *** 
    
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 (LT)-1,t-1 x 
Poor Credit     0.148  *** 0.139  *** 0.126  *** 0.290  *** 
    
(0.045) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.049) 
 Control Variables Yes      Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    
Constant Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Obs. 45,529 
  
39,640 
 
40,058 
 
45,529 
 
45,529 
 R2 0.37 
  
0.315 
 
0.296 
 
0.395 
 
0.355 
 Firm FE Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year FE Yes     Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Panel B: Non-BD firms 
    Poor Credit Indicator 
    Altman_Z-B50 Ohlson-A50 Idiovol-A50 Leverage-A50 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(LT)-1,t-1  ‒0.028    
0.034  
 
0.047  
 
‒0.015  
 
0.085  
 
 
(0.051) 
  
(0.062) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.071) 
 Decline 0.021  ***          
 
(0.003) 
          (LT)-1,t-1 x Decline 0.138            
 
(0.101) 
          
  
Poor Credit     
0.036  *** 0.035  *** 0.042  *** 0.023  *** 
    
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 (LT)-1,t-1 x 
Poor Credit     ‒0.002   
‒0.021  
 
0.054  
 
‒0.086  
 
    
(0.107) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.092) 
 Control Variables Yes      Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    
Constant Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Obs. 22,080 
  
20,372 
 
20,595 
 
22,080 
 
22,080 
 R2 0.263 
  
0.224 
 
0.215 
 
0.267 
 
0.256 
 Firm FE Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year FE Yes     Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
 
 
  
Table 6. Benign credit market versus stressed credit market 
This table presents the results of regressions to examine the RRE in times of benign credit markets 
versus stressed credit markets. Panels A and B present the results for the BD and non-BD firm 
subsamples, respectively. The dependent variable is EDF, the expected default frequency. The main 
independent variable is (LT)-1,t-1, the long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t – 1 that is due for 
repayment in year t. The control variables are Cash, MTB, Idiovol (idiosyncratic risk), Tangibility, Size, 
R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and IntCov (interest coverage). For details, see Appendix B. There 
are three stressed credit market indicators: (1) Baa-Aaa Spread is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the spread between yields on Baa- and Aaa-rated corporate bonds increases, (2) TED Spread is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the three-month TED spread‒the difference between the interest rate 
on interbank loans and the T-bill rate‒increases, and (3) Recession is a dummy variable that identifies 
recession years classified by the NBER. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects (FE). 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and are clustered at 
the firm level. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
Panel A: BD firms 
  (1) (2) (3) 
(LT)-1,t-1  0.018   
0.002  
 
0.002  
 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.024) 
 (LT)-1,t-1 x Baa-Aaa Spread 0.095  ***     
 
(0.033) 
     (LT)-1,t-1 x TED Spread   
0.115  *** 
  
   
(0.037) 
   (LT)-1,t-1 x Recession 
    
0.255  *** 
          (0.048)   
Control Variables Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Obs. 45,529 
 
45,529 
 
45,529 
 R2 0.342 
 
0.343 
 
0.343 
 Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   
Panel B: Non-BD firms 
  (1) (2) (3) 
(LT)-1,t-1  0.046   
‒0.010  
 
0.025  
 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.058) 
 (LT)-1,t-1 x Baa-Aaa Spread ‒0.055       
 
(0.089) 
     (LT)-1,t-1 x TED Spread   
0.068  
   
   
(0.094) 
   (LT)-1,t-1 x Recession 
    
‒0.023  
 
          (0.113)   
Control Variables Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Obs. 22,080 
 
22,080 
 
22,080 
 R2 0.252 
 
0.252 
 
0.252 
 Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   
 
  
Table 7. Alternative default risk measure: Annualized stock volatility 
This table reports the results of regressions aimed at understanding the impact of the rollover risk on 
the default probability. The dependent variable is StockVol, the annualized volatility computed by the 
standard deviation of logarithm daily stock returns over the next one year. The main independent 
variable is (LT)-1,t-1, the long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t – 1 that is due for repayment in 
year t. Columns (1) and (3) (Columns (2) and (4) report the estimators without (with) control variables 
for the BD and non-BD groups, respectively. The control variables are Cash, MTB, Idiovol 
(idiosyncratic risk), Tangibility, Size, R&D, Tax, Profitability, Leverage, and IntCov (interest coverage). 
For details, see Appendix B. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects (FE). Standard errors 
(in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and are clustered at the firm level. 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Subsample 
 BD BD Non-BD Non-BD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(LT)-1,t-1 0.251 *** 0.100 *** 0.081  
‒0.018  
 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.067) 
 
Control Variables No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Obs. 45,258 
 
45,258 
 
22,064 
 
22,064 
 
R2 0.083 
 
0.326 
 
0.164 
 
0.277 
 
Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8. Micro-level amplification forces and a stressed credit market: Results for annualized stock volatility 
This table presents the results of regressions to re-examine the RRE on default risk conditional on micro-level amplification forces and the overall credit market situation. The 
dependent variable is StockVol, the annualized stock volatility, computed by the standard deviation of logarithm daily stock returns over the next one year. The main 
independent variable is (LT)-1,t-1, the long-term debt outstanding at the end of year t – 1 that is due for repayment in year t. Panels A and B present the results for the BD and 
non-BD firm subsamples, respectively. The indicator of declining profitability (i.e., Decline), the poor credit indicator (i.e., Altman_Z-B50, Ohlson-A50, Idiovol-A50, and 
Leverage-A50), and the stressed credit market indicator (i.e., Baa-Aaa Spread, TED Spread, and Recession) are described in Tables 5 and 6. All specifications include firm 
and year fixed effects (FE). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and are clustered at the firm level. The superscripts ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: BD firms 
 
Micro-Level Amplification Forces 
 
Benign Credit Market versus Stressed Credit Market 
   
Poor Credit Indicator 
       
   
Altman_Z-B50 Ohlson-A50 Idiovol-A50 Leverage-A50 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) 
(LT)-1,t-1  0.008   
‒0.076  * ‒0.009  
 
‒0.266  *** ‒0.113  
  
0.071  
 
0.084  * 0.079  * 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.071) 
  
(0.043) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.041) 
 Decline 0.043  *** 
               
 
(0.003) 
                (LT)-1,t-1 x Decline 0.162  ***                
 
(0.051) 
                Poor Credit 
 
0.091  *** 0.061  *** 0.293  *** 0.026  *** 
       
   
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
        (LT)-1,t-1 x Poor Credit  0.220  *** 0.119  * 0.407  *** 0.243  ***        
   
(0.068) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.079) 
        (LT)-1,t-1 x Baa-Aaa Spread          
0.074  
     
            
(0.052) 
     (LT)-1,t-1 x TED Spread             
0.034  
   
              
(0.064) 
   (LT)-1,t-1 x Recession               
0.097  
 
                
(0.048) 
 Control Variables Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes      Yes    Yes    Yes    
  
Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Obs. 45,258 
 
39,632 
 
40,050 
 
45,258 
 
45,258 
  
45,258 
 
45,258 
 
45,258 
 R2 0.34 
 
0.363 
 
0.34 
 
0.507 
 
0.329 
  
0.326 
 
0.326 
 
0.326 
 Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   Yes   
Panel B: Non-BD firms 
 
Micro-Level Amplification Forces 
 
Benign Credit Market versus Stressed Credit Market 
   
Poor Credit Indicator 
       
   
Altman_Z-B50 Ohlson-A50 Idiovol-A50 Leverage-A50 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) 
(LT)-1,t-1  ‒0.054   
‒0.109  * ‒0.047  
 
‒0.068  * ‒0.040  
  
‒0.058  
 
0.007  
 
‒0.016  
 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.071) 
  
(0.076) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.066) 
 Decline 0.023  *** 
               
 
(0.003) 
                (LT)-1,t-1 x Decline 0.111                  
 
(0.107) 
                Poor Credit 
 
0.048  *** 0.034  *** 0.162  *** 0.025  *** 
       
   
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
        (LT)-1,t-1 x Poor Credit  0.170   
0.068  
 
0.075  
 
0.036  
        
   
(0.106) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.100) 
        (LT)-1,t-1 x Baa-Aaa Spread          
0.078  
     
            
(0.107) 
     (LT)-1,t-1 x TED Spread             
‒0.061  
   
              
(0.098) 
   (LT)-1,t-1 x Recession               
‒0.005  
 
                
(0.143) 
 Control Variables Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes      Yes    Yes    Yes    
Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Obs. 22,064 
 
20,372 
 
20,595 
 
22,064 
 
22,064 
  
22,064 
 
22,064 
 
22,064 
 R2 0.289 
 
0.347 
 
0.315 
 
0.437 
 
0.279 
  
0.276 
 
0.276 
 
0.277 
 Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year FE Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   Yes   
 
